Abstract. We investigate the relationship between Functional Encryption (FE) and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), demonstrating that, under certain assumptions, a Functional Encryption scheme supporting evaluation on two ciphertexts implies Fully Homomorphic Encryption. We first introduce the notion of Randomized Functional Encryption (RFE), a generalization of Functional Encryption dealing with randomized functionalities of interest in its own right, and show how to construct an RFE from a (standard) semantically secure FE. For this we define the notion of entropically secure FE and use it as an intermediary step in the construction. Finally we show that RFEs constructed in this way can be used to construct FHE schemes thereby establishing a relation between the FHE and FE primitives. We conclude the paper by recasting the construction of RFE schemes in the context of obfuscation.
Introduction
The goal of this work is to draw connections between FE and FHE. The motivation is twofold. On the one hand, from a purely theoretical point of view it is interesting to understand the relationship between these new concepts, both of which promise to guide much future research in the area. On the other hand, from a constructive point of view, we hope that by exploring this relationship we can also discover connections that will help us progress towards new constructions of FHE schemes, taking advantage of techniques used in constructing FE schemes. This motivation is even stronger in light of very recent developments in the area, which indicate that constructing efficient FE schemes supporting complex functionalities may be within our reach in the near future. For example, an FE for arbitrary functionalities has been recently proposed in [13] , as well as functional encryption for regular languages in [19] . Goldwasser et al. recently demonstrated that FHE together with attribute-based encryption implies FE [12] ; here we study the opposite problem, asking what additional assumptions can be used to build FHE from FE. To explain our high-level approach to accomplishing this goal, let us consider the main differences between FE and FHE. For any function f (·), an FHE scheme allows us to compute an encryption of f (x) from an encryption of x; whereas an FE scheme allows us to compute, in the clear, f (x) from an encryption of x. Our intuition is that an FE scheme supporting functions of the type Enc f , where Enc f (x) = Enc(f (x)) is a re-encryption of f (x), would be very close to constructing an FHE scheme. However, an immediate problem inherent to this approach is how to provide the tokens needed for the computation of Enc f , when f can be arbitrary. We will demonstrate that this can be done if one considers FE schemes that support functions on two inputs f (x 1 , x 2 ). In this case, it is sufficient to publish the token for Enc NAND (x 1 , x 2 ) = Enc(¬(x 1 ∧ x 2 )), as any Boolean function can be computed using a circuit of NAND gates.
When we set out to formally prove this intuition we stumbled across two major definitional issues: First, the "re-encryption" functionality described above is a "randomized" functionality, a case which is not treated in the original definitions of FE [7, 16] . Second, this approach to constructing FHEs from FEs relies on a functionality that re-encrypts under the original encryption key. However, this implies extending the syntax of functional encryption schemes to allow for functionalities that take the domain parameters as an additional input (i.e., where the functionality can depend on the master public key).
RANDOMIZED FUNCTIONAL ENCRYPTION. In Randomized Functional Encryption an encryptor is able to hide an input within a ciphertext in such a way that authorized decryptors can only recover the result of applying a randomized function to it. Intuitively, the encryption and/or decryption operations can take additional randomness that is fed into the randomized function upon decryption, ensuring that the recovered image f (x) is distributed as if the randomized function was calculated on fresh randomness r as f (x; r). This is a correctness criterion. As for functional encryption, the security goal in RFE is to ensure that the decryption operation leaks no more about x than that which could be inferred from the output of the randomized functionality with private randomness.We introduce a natural indistinguishability-based notion of security for randomized functional encryption to capture this intuition, and show that it suffices to establish a relation to fully homomorphic encryption. Indeed, we show that an IND-CPA-secure RFE supporting the NAND re-encryption functionality Enc NAND (x 1 , x 2 ) described above can be used as a secure fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
Randomized Functional Encryption is an interesting cryptographic primitive in its own right. In the full version of this paper we show that various existing public-key encryption schemes can actually be seen as particular instances of this primitive, e.g., those supporting re-randomization of ciphertexts and re-encryption. That said, our primary motivation in introducing the notion of RFE is to enable the construction of FHE from FE, so we do not attempt to fully explore the subtleties of RFE. In particular, we provide and use a very strong indistinguishability notion for RFE which is likely too strong to admit many interesting functionalities, but suffices for building FHE. We leave further exploration of RFE to future work.
FROM FUNCTIONAL ENCRYPTION TO RFE AND FHE. We show how FE schmes can be used to build RFE schemes, which, in turn, can be used to construct a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, as described above. To this end, we begin by extending the syntax and security definitions for functional encryption schemes as follows: 1) we modify the syntax to allow functionalities to take multiple inputs,as well as the domain parameters as an extra input; 2) we introduce a new indistinguishability notion of security for FE schemes that we call entropic security in the spirit of the eponymous definition of Russel and Wang [18] ; and 3) we extend the semantic security definition of Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan, and Wee [13] to accommodate our new syntactic extensions. We also discuss the relation between the two security notions we propose, and show that, under certain conditions, semantic security implies entropic security.
We then present a generic construction of an RFE scheme supporting a given randomized functionality RFn of arity n, from an entropically secure FE supporting a specific functionality Fn of the same arity. Interestingly, for binary functionalities we require a PRF that resists a particular class of related-key attacks [5, 4] in order to prove the security of our construction. When combined with the semantically secure FE construction of Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan, and Wee [13] , our results for the unary case yield positive feasibility results for RFE supporting complex functionalities.
Finally, we present two constructions of FHE from functional encryption. The direct construction from an RFE supporting NAND re-encryption mentioned above gives us that entropically secure functional encryption supporting a binary functionality (and taking also the domain parameters) implies FHE. However, we cannot show that the required RFE scheme can be constructed by assuming semantic security alone. Our second construction uses two RFEs and a PKE, and it enables leveled homomorphic computation using an adaptation of the bootstrapping technique of Gentry [11] to the functional setting. We can relate the security of this construction to semantically secure functional encryption supporting functionalities of arity 2 (there is no need for the functionality to take the domain parameters). As is typical of bootstrapping techniques, an extra assumption akin to key-dependent message (KDM) security [11] allows us to use this construction as an FHE scheme.
CONNECTION WITH OBFUSCATION. As our final contribution, we explore the problem of obfuscating specific re-encryption functionalities, introducing new notions extending those proposed in earlier works on re-encryption [14, 9] . We then explain how to use such obfuscated circuits to obtain RFE schemes suitable for FHE constructions.
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER. In Section 2 we recall the syntax and security of FE schemes, and introduce a set of extensions that we require for our results. In Section 3 we introduce randomized functional encryption. In Section 4 we introduce the notion of entropic securityand, in Section 5, we present generic constructions of fully homomorphic encryption schemes from RFE schemes.Finally, the connection with obfuscated re-encryption is explored in Section 6.
Functional Encryption
NOTATION. We start by settling the notation. We write x ← y for assigning value y to variable x. We write x ← $ X for sampling x from set X uniformly at random. If A is a probabilistic algorithm we write y ← $ A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) for the action of running A on inputs x 1 , . . . , x n with random coin chosen uniformly at random, and assigning the result to y. We use ":" for appending to a list, and denote the empty string by . For random variable X we denote by [X] the support of X, i.e., the set of all values that X takes with nonzero probability. All algorithms in this paper are probabilistic polynomial-time. We say η(λ) is negligible if |η(λ)| ∈ λ −ω (1) . Finally in various security games we use the notation A O and adversary A haveing oracle access to all oracles specified within the same figure as the game.
We now formalize the syntax and security of an FE scheme, extending it with respect to several features that were proposed in [7] . DETERMINISTIC FUNCTIONALITY. A deterministic functionality is an algorithm Fn implementing an n-ary function f over a parameter space Fn.Prms, a key space Fn.KeySp, and a plaintext space Fn.MsgSp n :
We require that the key space contains a special key called the empty key denoted k . The empty key abstracts the information that publicly leaks from a ciphertext. This function in most natural cases would only depend on a single argument, although one may envisage the more general case where it has arity n. Throughout the paper we assume the messages in the message space are of equal length, and whenever the empty key is not explicitly defined, it is assumed that it returns the length of its first input.
SYNTAX. A functional encryption (FE) scheme FE for the functionality Fn (of arity n) is specified by four algorithms as follows. 
SECURITY. We now discuss security notions for FE that match our syntactic extensions to the primitive. Given the limitations of indistinguishability-based notions already identified in [7, 16] and further discussed in the full version of this paper, we adopt a semantic (or simulation-based) security notion akin to those in [7, 16, 13, 3, 6, 2] . More precisely, we adopt of [13] extended to multiple encryption queries. Our choice is due to the conceptual simplicity of the model and to the general feasibility result we automatically obtain for unary functionalities. We restrict our attention to TNA queries to avoid impossibility results such as those presented in [7, 6, 2] . The definition formalizes the intuition that in a secure FE scheme, no information beyond that which is leaked through extracted tokens is available to an adversary. The fine details of the semantic security model are not important to our results, as long as the model is strong enough to imply an indistinguishability-based notion (Definition 8) that we introduce later in the paper. THE Func ORACLE. Note that providing a ciphertext and a set of tokens to the adversary in the real world allows the adversary to compute many images of the functionality simply by encrypting fresh ciphertexts and decrypting (evaluating) them along with the provided ciphertext. Our definition provides an oracle to the simulator in the ideal world that gives it essentially the same power. Here I denotes a set of index pairs (i, j) which indicates hidden message j should be used in position i of the functionality. Note that in the single-message setting and for unary functionalities, this oracle is equivalent to directly providing a list of images to the simulator, as in the definition proposed in [13] FEASIBILITY. The feasibility results presented in [13, 16] directly carry over to our definition for unary functionalities in the single-message model, where the adversary may only request a single challenge ciphertext. This can be extended to the multi-message model (for the TNA case) through a composition theorem, but we do not discuss the details here due to space constraints. For the multiary case, however, the feasibility problems resurface even in this more restricted scenario. More precisely, a problem similar to that identified for noninteractive noncommitting encryption [15] may arise. However, we do not know of any impossibility result that excludes the construction of an FE scheme for the specific functionalities that we require for building FHE schemes and leave a detailed treatment to future research.
Definition 1 (Semantic security). Let games SS-R
Adv ss-cpa FE,A,S,D (λ) := Pr SS-R FE,A,D (1 λ ) ⇒ T −Pr SS-I FE,A,S,D (1 λ ) ⇒ T Game SS-R FE,A,D (1 λ ): KList ← [ k ]; m ←⊥ (Msk, Mpk) ← $ FE.Setup(1 λ ) α ← $ A Token,Enc 0 (Mpk) Return D(MList, α) Game SS-I FE,A,S,D (1 λ ): KList ← [ k ]; m ←⊥ (Msk, Mpk) ← $ FE.Setup(1 λ ) α ← $ A Token,Enc 1 (Mpk) Return D(MList, α) oracle Token(k): TK ← $ FE.TKGen(k, Msk) KList ← k : KList Return TK oracle Enc0(m): c ← $ FE.Enc(m, Mpk) MList ← m : MList Return c oracle Func(I, k, m1, . . . , mn): For (i, j) ∈ I do mi ← MList[j] Return Fn(Mpk, k, m1, . . . , mn) oracle Enc1(m): c ← $ S Func (Mpk, KList) MList ← m : MList Return c
Randomized Functional Encryption
In this section we propose a new cryptographic primitive that generalizes FE to randomized functionalities. We start by formally introducing the syntax and security of randomized functional encryption schemes. In the full version we describe several examples of cryptographic primitives that can be seen as particular cases of RFE.
RANDOMIZED FUNCTIONALITY. A randomized functionality is a probabilistic algorithm RFn implementing an n-ary function f that also takes a set of random coins from a randomness space RFn.RndSp:
We assume the random coins are uniformly distributed over RFn.RndSp.
SYNTAX. A randomized functional encryption (RFE) scheme
for the randomized functionality RFn (of arity n) is specified by four algorithms as follows.
1. RFE.Setup(1 λ ): This is the setup algorithm. On input the security parameter, it outputs a master secret key Msk and a master public key Mpk, a key space, and a message space. We require that the set of all possible master public keys output by the setup algorithm, the key space, and the message space are identical to RFn.Prms, RFn.KeySp, and RFn.MsgSp respectively. 2. RFE.TKGen(k, Msk): This is the token-generation algorithm. On input a key k ∈ RFn.KeySp and a master secret key Msk, it outputs a token TK. 3. RFE.Enc(m, Mpk): This is the encryption algorithm. On input a message m ∈ RFn.MsgSp and a master public key Mpk, it outputs a ciphertext c. 4. RFE.Dec(c 1 , . . . , c n , TK, Mpk): This is the (possibly probabilistic) decryption (or evaluation) algorithm. On input n ciphertexts, a token TK, and a master public key Mpk, it outputs a message m or a special symbol ⊥.
CORRECTNESS. Intuitively, the correctness requirement imposes that the distribution of a decrypted value (over the random coins of the encryption and decryption algorithms) is computationally indistinguishable from that obtained by sampling the randomized functionality directly on the encrypted message. We formalize this property next.
Definition 2 (Correctness). Let game COR RFE,A be as in Figure 2 . Let RFE be a randomized functional encryption scheme. We say RFE is correct if, for any adversary A, the following definition advantage is negligible. We emphasize that the adversary in the correctness game has access to Msk (this is needed to model correctness for Msk-dependent messages), and that it may force some of the ciphertexts to be repeatedly used in the input to the decryption algorithm.
SECURITY. Our proposed notions of security for RFE are indistinguishability based. We will formalize the definitions and then discuss why the models do not necessarily suffer from the same limitations as IND-CPA security for FE.
Definition 3 (Indistinguishability). Let game IND-CPA RFE,A be as shown in Figure 3 . We say RFE is IND-CPA secure if, for any adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible. We observe that, unless the functionality has special characteristics, the images recovered by the adversary may allow it to trivially win the game; for instance, the above definition is unrealizable for nontrivial deterministic functionalities. To deal with this, we will consider restricted classes of legitimate adversaries that cannot "trivially" win the game. We start with a definition which characterizes when image values can be used to win the IND-CPA game.
Definition 4 (Message-hiding RFE). Let game MH RFE,A be as in Figure 4 . We say RFE is message hiding if, for any adversary A , the following definition of advantage is negligible. Func(I, m1, . . . , mn, k): The message-hiding property detects whether an adversary can distinguish messages queried to the LR oracle by looking at images of the functionality. Note that this may depend intrinsically on the way in which the domain parameters are sampled by the setup algorithm of the RFE scheme, and hence we have honest parameter generation. We can now introduce variants of the IND-CPA definition where we exclude trivial attacks by adversaries that win the game by exploiting information leaked via the images. To this end, we formalize the notion of an associated adversary B that mimics A's capabilities in the MH game. Let us now introduce our weaker indistinguishability notions before discussing the legitimacy conditions. Definition 7 (Restricted indistinguishability). Let RFE be a randomized functional encryption scheme. The R-IND-CPA security of RFE requires the advantage of any legitimate adversary A in the IND-CPA game to be negligible.
Definition 5 (Associated adversary
The following implications are easy to verify: IND-CPA =⇒ R-IND-CPA ; R-IND-CPA + MH =⇒ IND-CPA . Note also that, if scheme RFE is IND-CPA secure, then the supported functionality must be MH secure. (If the functionality is not message hiding, then the adversary could trivially break the security of the RFE scheme by simply distinguishing the images it recovers using legitimately retrieved tokens). As we shall see later in the paper, our constructions of a homomorphic scheme from an RFE impose that the adversary is unrestricted in its challenge query. One way to achieve this is to concentrate on RFEs that are provably message hiding. The potential limitations of this indistinguishabilitybased definition are discussed in the full version of this paper.
Entropic security
We now turn our attention to a particular class of (standard) functional encryption schemes that we will use as a stepping-stone between the standard notions of functional encryption and randomized functional encryption. We call such functional encryption schemes entropically secure.
Intuitively, entropic security imposes that an adversary has a negligible advantage in distinguishing encryptions provided that a part of the encrypted message is sampled uniformly at random. To this end, we must restrict our attention to functionalities Fn for which the plaintext space Fn.MsgSp is partitioned as Fn.MsgSp m × Fn.MsgSp r . For FE schemes supporting such functionalities, we can define a natural adaptation of the IND-CPA model as follows. Figure 5 . Let FE be a functional encryption scheme with a portioned message space. We say FE is IND-ECPA secure if for any adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible.
Definition 8 (Entropic indistinguishability). Let game IND-ECPA FE,A be as in
Unlike the standard definition of IND-CPA, the above definition is meaningful for functionalities of arbitrary arity. Note also that unless the functionality has special characteristics the images recovered by the adversary may allow it to trivially win the game. We therefore adopt a similar strategy to that presented for RFE security, define an entropic message-hiding property, and impose a legitimacy condition on the adversary to obtain a weaker flavor of the definition. We present these definitions in the full version of the paper. In entropic message hiding, the two differences to the model presented for RFEs are the following. Firstly, the LR oracle now samples part of the hidden message, as in the IND-ECPA definition. Secondly, the Func oracle allows the adversary to evaluate the functionality choosing all the r inputs except those that correspond to LR queries. This means that the EMH property (contrarily to message hiding for RFEs, where fresh images are sampled on each query to Func) entails a form of security under randomness reuse across the different functions k that are queried by the adversary. Note also that for multi-ary functionalities the adversary can maliciously choose part of the randomness components in the input to Fn. Later in the paper we will see how to build entropically message-hiding FEs. The definition of legitimacy is analogous to that presented for RFEs. We call the resulting definition restricted entropic indistinguishability. We also note that the legitimacy of an IND-ECPA adversary is a natural generalization of the restriction imposed in the IND-CPA model for FEs that the functions queried to the Token oracle must all collide on the challenge messages.
Constructing RFEs from FEs
We now show how to construct RFEs for arbitrary functionalities starting from FE schemes. Technically, we will show that specific entropically secure FE schemes suffice, and then establish a connection to semantically secure FE.
The intuition behind our construction is the following. Suppose our goal is to construct an RFE scheme for a functionality RFn of arity n. We begin by defining a derandomized version of RFn, denoted Fn, of arity n, which we call the deterministic functionality associated to RFn. We then show that the simple generic construction in Figure 6 converts a functional encryption scheme FE into a correct and secure RFE scheme for RFn, provided that the underlying scheme FE is correct and entropically secure for Fn. Observe that the only modification that is made to the original functional encryption scheme is that the encryption algorithm samples extra randomness that is encrypted along with the message. This naturally relates to entropic security, where we considered functionalities where the message space was partitioned as MsgSp = MsgSp m × MsgSp r . We now formalize this intuition. Observe that the derandomized functionality must simulate independent samplings of RFn, whilst reusing the same input randomness. We now state the correctness result. The proof is a direct reduction and is given in the full version. Proposition 1. Let RFn and Fn be a randomized and a deterministic functionality, respectively. Suppose that Fn correctly derandomizes RFn. Then, any correct FE supporting Fn yields, by the construction in Figure 6 , a correct RFE scheme supporting RFn.
BUILDING DERANDOMIZED FUNCTIONALITIES. We now consider how unary and binary functionalities can be derandomized. (The techniques used to deal with the binary case naturally extend to arity greater than 2.) For each randomized functionality that we want to support in the generic RFE construction of Figure 6 , we define an associated deterministic functionality as follows.
Definition 10 (Associated deterministic functionality). Let RFn be a randomized functionality. We first show that an associated deterministic functionality, as defined as above, satisfies the correctness derandomization criterion. The proof of the following theorem is a direct reduction and can be found in the full version.
Theorem 1 (Derandomization via PRFs). Let RFn be a unary or a binary randomized functionality. Let Fn be the associated deterministic functionality to RFn that uses the pseudorandom function PRF. Suppose that PRF satisfies the standard notion of PRF security. Then Fn correctly derandomizes RFn.
SECURITY. We can now discuss the security of the construction. The next theorem shows that an FE scheme supporting the associated deterministic functionality to RFn suffices to obtain a secure RFE with an analogous security level.
Theorem 2 (Security of the RFE construction). Let RFn be a randomized functionality and let Fn be its associated deterministic functionality. Let FE be a functional encryption scheme supporting Fn. Then if FE is IND-ECPA secure, the RFE scheme RFE resulting from the generic construction in Figure 6 is IND-CPA secure. A similar result holds for the restricted indistinguishability game if the PRF is Φ-RKA secure, where
The proof is a direct reduction. However, for the restricted case, one needs to prove that the resulting IND-ECPA adversary is legitimate. The most challenging part of this argument consists of establishing that any successful EMH adversary against FE gives rise to a successful MH adversary against RFE. The intuition is as follows. The RKA security of the PRF ensures that its outputs look random even if one of the inputs to the functionality is maliciously chosen. This allows us to make a transition from the entropically message-hiding game to another game where the random coins of RFn are generated via a truly random function. The reduction to the legitimacy then consists of proving that any adversary succeeding in this game would either be breaking the MH property, or triggering the unlikely event of guessing input s, when this is sampled uniformly at random. Details of the proof may be found in the full version.
Constructing entropically secure FE In this section we discuss how to construct entropically secure FEs from semantically secure functional encryption schemes. In our constructions we will be relying on FE schemes supporting functionalities that do not depend on the domain parameters, as this is the standard FE notion from [7, 13] (modulo the arity extension). Therefore we first discuss how to construct a functionality that may depend on the parameters from one with a larger key space that no longer does. This then leads us to a natural transformation of FE schemes converting an FE scheme supporting the constructed parameter-independent functionality to one which supports the original parameter-dependent functionality. We show that this transformation preserves semantic security, and conclude the section by showing that any semantically secure FE scheme is also entropically secure.
REMOVING PARAMETER DEPENDENCY. Let Fn be a parameter-dependent functionality. We define a parameter-independent functionality as
Therefore, the key space of Fn is Fn.Prms × Fn.KeySp. Let us look at a concrete example useful for our purposes. Consider an FE scheme in which we would like to support the following binary deterministic parameter-dependent functionality:
where PKE is an encryption scheme and k NAND is the only key supported by the functionality. The converted functionality has key space identical to the public key space of the PKE, and is given by
We present our transformation in Figure 8 , where we build scheme FE for Fn NAND from scheme FE for Fn NAND . Note that although FE NAND permits extracting tokens for encryption under all public keys in the underlying PKE scheme, FE NAND samples a single public key at set-up, which it publishes along with the master public key. The fact that the public key is sampled honestly means that not only we can rely on the security properties of the PKE, but also that we can include (pk, sk) in the master key for FE NAND . This means that the holder of the master public key is capable of recovering encrypted messages from Fn NAND images, a feature that we will use later on. The following result establishes that the above transformation yields a correct and secure FE scheme. The proof can be found in the full version. The intuition is that FE NAND uses only a subset of the functionality of FE NAND , and so the simulator implied by the hypothesis can be used to establish the semantic security of the construction. An important aspect of this result is that it goes through for the case in which the semantic security adversary places a single extraction query. This is important for feasibility, as the construction in [13] of FE schemes for general functionalities imposes the restriction that the semantic security adversary places a bounded number of such queries. Looking ahead, the FHE constructions we will present rely on FEs supporting functionalities with a single key.
FROM SEMANTIC TO ENTROPIC SECURITY. We now show that semantic security is strong enough to imply entropic security. Given that our definition of semantic security is restricted to the TNA scenario, we obtain entropic security in a similar setting. Luckily, entropic security under TNA attacks suffices for the results in the next section. The intuition of the proof (given in the full version) is as follows. Any IND-ECPA attacker can be recast as a semantic security attacker that wins the real-world game with the same probability. The key observation is that the ideal world environment matches to entropic message hiding game, when this is played by an associated adversary to the original IND-ECPA attacker. However, the legitimacy condition on the attacker implies that this associated adversary cannot be successful, and that the real-world advantage (and hence the IND-ECPA advantage) must also be negligible.
Putting the above results together we obtain a path to constructing an RFE scheme for a randomized functionality RFn as follows. 1) Construct Fn, the associated deterministic functionality to RFn; 2) Construct scheme FE that is correct for Fn; 3) Prove that FE is semantically secure, and hence, by the above theorem, it is R-IND-ECPA secure; 4) Let RFE be the randomized scheme associated to FE. By Theorem 2 it is R-IND-CPA secure; 5) Finally, to achieve security against unrestricted adversaries (IND-CPA security), establish that RFE is message hiding. We will be using this strategy in the following section.
Relating Homomorphic and Functional Encryption Schemes
We saw earlier in the paper that homomorphic public-key encryption can be seen as a particular instance of a randomized functional encryption scheme. We now combine this observation with our results from the previous section to formalize a relation between FHE and FE.
FHE FROM ENTROPICALLY SECURE FE. We restrict our attention to homomorphic public-key encryption schemes that support encrypting bits (rather than strings) and which allow the homomorphic computation of an arbitrary number of NAND gates. We note that since NAND is complete, we can support the evaluation of arbitrary functions by first representing the function as a circuit of NAND gates and using bit-wise encryption on the inputs.
We start from an RFE scheme supporting the following binary randomized functionality RFn, which we call NAND re-encryption, and is given by
This functionality has message space {0, 1} and it supports a single key k NAND (in addition to the empty key). We also assume, for the sake of correctness, that RFE supports a special decryption operation Dec(Msk, c) akin to that of PKEs.
Our first construction of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is as follows. The key generation algorithm generates RFE domain parameters and further extracts the token for k NAND , which is added to the public key. Encryption is simply RFE encryption, and decryption is carried out using the special algorithm Dec(Msk, c). Evaluation of a single NAND gate on two ciphertexts is carried out by running RFE.Dec(c 1 , c 2 , TK k NAND ). Furthermore, the correctness of the underlying RFE scheme ensures that one can keep computing over the encrypted results, as the evaluated ciphertext will be with overwhelming probability in the co-domain of the RFE encryption circuit. In this way one can evaluate circuits of arbitrary size. Finally, it is easy to see that the IND-CPA security of the resulting FHE directly reduces to the IND-CPA security of the RFE scheme for single-message, TNA attacks, where by definition the adversary is unrestricted. We also observe that, by construction, this FHE is compact and function hiding. This is because the result of any computation is indistinguishable from a fresh encryption of the result of the computation, even to the holder of the decryption key. This construction and Theorems 1 and 2 immediately yield the following result. We note that the underlying FE must be entropically secure against unrestricted adversaries. However, as we are dealing with bit-wise encryption, this is really the minimal assumption that one could have: the scheme should be secure when the adversary is allowed to choose challenge messages m 0 = m 1 .
FHE FROM SEMANTICALLY SECURE FE. The previous construction reveals an interesting relation between entropically secure FE, RFE, and FHE. However, it does not give a relation between semantically secure FE and FHE. It would be tempting to try to build an RFE scheme such as the one described above from semantically secure FE, using Theorem 3 to obtain security against restricted adversaries, and then proving that the resulting RFE is message hiding to obtain unrestricted security. However, this approach fails: the fact that the randomized functionality is defined using the same RFE scheme that supports it introduces a circular dependency that we cannot overcome. Intuitively, assuming that selfre-encryption is message hiding amounts to assuming that RFE construction is secure to begin with. (Note that in Theorem 4 this circular argument is broken by explicitly assuming security against unrestricted adversaries.)
We present an alternative, slightly more involved construction to overcome the above difficulty. We require two RFE schemes supporting the following binary functionalities, each having a single key (in addition to the empty key).
RFE NAND supports NAND re-encryption, with the caveat that re-encryption targets a standard public-key encryption scheme. More precisely, RFn NAND ((Mpk, pk), k NAND , b 1 , b 2 ) := PKE.Enc(¬(b 1 ∧ b 2 ), pk) .
We also impose that the master secret key for RFE NAND includes the secret key sk corresponding to pk. RFE boot enables a functional analogue of the bootstrapping technique of Gentry [11] . It permits functionally decrypting a ciphertext under PKE and reencrypting it under RFE NAND :
RFn boot ((Mpk, Mpk NAND ), k boot , c, sk) := RFE NAND .Enc(PKE.Dec(c, sk), Mpk NAND ) .
